Assessing a speaker's reliability falls short of providing an argument : a reply to Marius F. Jung by Jacob, Pierre
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When confronted with a speaker’s assertion, her addressee can either fulfill the
speaker’s informative intention and accept the new belief or not. If he does, he can
either accept the new belief on the sole basis of the speaker’s authority or not. If
not, then the addressee can examine the reliability of the speaker’s assertion. If
he does, then he can either check the content of the speaker’s assertion with the
contents of his own beliefs or scrutinize the speaker herself as the source of the
novel information. If the latter, then he can either examine the speaker’s epistemic
competence in the relevant domain of discourse or the speaker’s moral benevol-
ence (or both). None of the above processes amounts to the addressee producing
an argument, let alone an ad hominem argument. Only if the speaker offers an ar-
gument to back her assertion could the addressee commit an ad hominem counter-
argument in his attempt at rebutting the speaker’s. 
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In  my  paper,  I  probed  the  gap  between  the
Gricean  approach  and  Millikan’s  approach  to
human communicative agency. In particular,  I
argued  in  favor  of  the  Gricean  separability
thesis, i.e., the thesis that the process whereby
an addressee fulfills  an agent’s  communicative
intention (by understanding or recognizing her
informative intention) is distinct from the pro-
cess  whereby  the  addressee  further  fulfills  (if
and when he does) the agent’s informative in-
tention (by accepting either a new belief or a
new desire for action). I am grateful to Marius
F. Jung for his valuable comments on my paper,
in which he tries to offer positive suggestions to-
wards  bridging  the  gap  between  the  Gricean
separability thesis and (social) epistemology. 
In particular, I agree with Marius F. Jung
that the issues of whether and to what extent a
communicative agent’s testimony should or can
be assessed as reliable and justified, and thereby
construed as knowledge (and not as mere opin-
ion)  by her  recipient,  are  of  fundamental  im-
portance. I also agree with him that it is worth-
while  to  try  and bridge the  gap between the
psychological  investigation  of  the  process
whereby an addressee assesses the reliability of
a  speaker’s  testimony  and  the  major  divide
between the reductionist and the anti-reduction-
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ist  perspectives  in  the  epistemology  of  testi-
mony. However, I still want to resist using the
particular bridge (or bridges) Jung is building
for me. In the following, I want to briefly ex-
plain why. 
First of all, let us be clear that what we
are dealing with here is the addressee’s basic
epistemic task of assessing the reliability of a
communicative  agent’s  (the  speaker’s)  testi-
mony or assertion, i.e., utterances with truth-
conditional  contents,  because  only  assertions
can  be  assessed  for  their  reliability  or  be-
lievability.  Only a speaker’s assertions,  not a
speaker’s requests, can directly enlarge her ad-
dressee’s knowledge of the world. For the pur-
pose  of  the  discussion  of  Jung’s  epistemolo-
gical project, we should simply ignore address-
ees’  responses  to  speakers’  utterances  of  re-
quests, i.e., of utterances that lack truth-con-
ditional contents. (I ignore here the fact that
a speaker’s request may enlarge an addressee’s
knowledge  of  the  speaker’s  own  character
traits.) 
Secondly, as I understand it, Jung would
like to directly link the investigation of the ad-
dressee’s  task  of  assessing  the  reliability  of  a
speaker’s assertion to the dispute between the
reductionist and the anti-reductionist perspect-
ive in the epistemology of testimony. I will re-
construct Jung’s basic strategy by means of the
six following assumptions.
• He construes the addressee’s overall process
of assessment of the reliability of a speaker’s
assertion as an argument. 
• As I understand it, he also accepts Sperber
et al.’s (2010) view that the overall process
whereby an addressee assesses the reliabil-
ity of a speaker’s assertion can be divided
into  two  component  processes:  the  assess-
ment of the authority of the speaker (who is
the source of the testimony) and the assess-
ment of the  content of the speaker’s asser-
tion. 
• He further focuses on the addressee’s assess-
ment of the  authority of the speaker as the
source of the testimony, at the expense of the
assessment of the content of the speaker’s as-
sertion. 
• He links the addressee’s assessment of the au-
thority of  the speaker  as the source of  the
testimony to ad hominem arguments. 
• He  draws  a  distinction  between  local  and
global ad hominem arguments. 
• Finally, he argues that only local, not global,
ad  hominem arguments  are  valid  methods
whereby an addressee can assess the reliabil-
ity of the speaker’s assertion. 
I  want mainly to take issue with Jung’s  very
first assumption: when assessing a speaker’s as-
sertion, the addressee is evaluating the reliabil-
ity or believability of her utterance. He is  not
arguing with her  and therefore not producing
an  ad hominem argument. (Construing the ad-
dressee’s  process  of  appraisal  as  an  attack
against the speaker seems far-fetched to me.) In
accordance with Jung’s second assumption (at
least,  on  my  reconstruction  of  his  train  of
thought), the addressee’s appraisal can in turn
be seen as a two-fold process: the addressee can
focus on either the content or the source of the
speaker’s  utterance  (or  both).  If  the  former,
then the addressee’s task can be construed as a
consistency check:  he checks the compatibility
of the truth of the speaker’s assertion with the
truths of a relevant sub-set of his own beliefs. In
the  latter  case,  he  scrutinizes  some  of  the
speaker’s relevant moral or “personal” proper-
ties (to use Jung’s own phrase). In particular,
he  will  assess  the  personal  authority  of  the
speaker  along  two  main  dimensions:  her  epi-
stemic  competence  (or  knowledge)  about  the
relevant domain of discourse and her moral hon-
esty, i.e., her benevolence towards him. 
Of  course,  the  addressee’s  assessment  of
the speaker’s reliability along these two dimen-
sions is an inferential process, which builds on
the addressee’s beliefs about both the content of
the speaker’s  assertion and the  speaker’s  per-
sonal  authority.  In  an  informal  sense,  it  is  a
reasoning process. But I want to resist the view
that this process should be construed as an ar-
gument, let alone as an ad hominem argument.
As Sperber et al. (2010) and Mercier & Sperber
(2011) have interestingly argued (no pun inten-
ded), to argue is to try and cause an addressee
to accept a new belief (to endorse the truth of
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some proposition), by providing explicit reasons
for it, i.e., by construing it as the conclusion of
a set of premises from which it derives either
deductively  or  inductively.  In  fact,  arguments
are devices used by a speaker in order to try to
overcome her addressee’s reluctance to fulfill her
informative intention (i.e., his reluctance to ac-
cept a new belief in accordance with her inform-
ative intention), on the sole grounds of her au-
thority.  If  so,  then  speakers  (communicative
agents) argue, but an addressee doesn’t: an ad-
dressee  evaluates the  speaker’s  argument.  Of
course,  an  addressee  who  disagrees  with  a
speaker’s argument in favor of some proposition
P can turn into a speaker and offer counter-ar-
guments to try to cause his opponent to change
her mind about the truth of P. 
1 Conclusion
When a speaker makes an assertion, she com-
mits herself  to the truth of  some proposition.
She thereby knowingly takes the risk that her
addressee examines the reliability of her asser-
tion by either checking the content of the asser-
ted proposition or by scrutinizing her epistemic
and moral authority. The addressee’s choice is
to either fulfill the speaker’s communicative in-
tention or not. She can further do it on the sole
ground of the speaker’s authority or not. As I
see it, the issue of whether the addressee could
wrong the  speaker  by  committing  some  epi-
stemic injustice towards her cannot arise in the
process whereby the addressee assesses the reli-
ability of the speaker’s mere assertion of P. It
can only arise  if  and when the speaker  offers
some explicit  argument in favor of proposition
P,  in  the  reasoning  process  whereby  the  ad-
dressee  evaluates  the  speaker’s  explicit  argu-
ment in favor of P, i.e., the link between P and
the premises selected by the speaker to justify
P. Only then could the addressee produce an ad
hominem counter-argument  (either  local  or
global) meant to successfully or unsuccessfully
rebut the speaker’s argument for P.
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